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ABSTRACT
The Canadian environmental assessment (EA) regime is broken. At a time when the
Canadian economy is both increasingly sluggish and unsustainable, we have an
obligation – and perhaps a once-in-a-generation opportunity – to fundamentally reform
EA to enable it to finally live up to its promise of promoting sound and sustainabilitybased decisions. This task is even more pressing in light of the global commitment under
the Paris Climate Change Agreement to rapidly transition to greenhouse gas emissions
neutrality. Among the many priorities of meaningful EA reform – moving beyond
project-level assessments, focusing on net positive contributions to sustainability,
avoiding costly trade-offs among interdependent economic, ecological, and social
objectives – we focus on the overarching need for polyjural collaboration and polycentric
consensus-based decision-making. We argue that any serious effort to move from projectlevel EAs focused exclusively on adverse biophysical impacts towards a fully integrated,
sustainability-based assessment (SA) regime requires a polyjural and polycentric
approach capable of facilitating collaborative experimentation among multiple
jurisdictional actors, including the federal government, provinces, territories,
municipalities, Indigenous peoples, NGOs, academia, project proponents and industry
groups, and the Canadian public. After examining the constitutional and political
dimensions of the federal and provincial governments’ role in EA, we provide two
compelling rationales for transitioning to a SA regime. The paper concludes by setting
out a series of possible forms of SA for the purpose of informing the federal
government’s review of its EA regime. In particular, we identify and analyze the
competing options for jurisdictional cooperation, collaboration, and consensus-based
assessment processes along with the constitutional and practical policy implications of
each.
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POLYJURAL AND POLYCENTRIC SUSTAINABILITY ASSESSMENT:
A ONCE-IN-A-GENERATION LAW REFORM OPPORTUNITY
… the level of ambition set by the Paris Agreement will require global emissions to
approach zero by the second half of the century and that all governments, Indigenous
peoples, as well as civil society, business and individual Canadians, should be mobilized
in order to face this challenge, bringing their respective strengths and capabilities to
enable Canada to maximize the economic growth and middle class job opportunities of a
cleaner, more resilient future[.]1
I.

INTRODUCTION

Considered by some as “faddish and fuzzy,” the idea of sustainability is nonetheless
“here to stay.”2 According to The Economist, a newspaper that champions “individual
freedom, free markets and a limited state”,3 “there is no getting away from the subject….
Last year the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals were adopted. Many investors
increasingly fret over environmental risks, and are demanding policies that lessen them.
Consumers care more, too, as a rash of examples attests.”4 But as The Economist also
observes, after two decades of many worthy initiatives, “acting to implement sustainable
practices in a meaningful way is still far harder than gushing about it.”5 Or as the Body
Shop’s Director of International Campaigns puts it, “sustainability is just being slightly
less awful.”6
Enter environmental assessment (EA). In a recent presentation on the future of EA in
Canada, the 40-year legacy of federal EAs was characterized as “making bad projects a
little less bad.”7 More recently, another commentary on EA observed that the ability of
EA to “alter the trajectory of economic activities in the direction of sustainability has
never been fully realized.”8

1

Canadian Intergovernmental Conference Secretariat, “Vancouver Declaration on clean growth and climate
change”,
(3
March
2016),
online:
<http://www.scics.gc.ca/english/conferences.asp?a=viewdocument&id=2401> [emphasis added].
2
“Companies’ green strategies: In the thicket of it”, The Economist, (30 July 2016) at 52.
3
“Liberal blues: The many meanings of liberalism”, The Economist, (30 July 2016) at 70.
4
“Companies’ green strategies”, supra note 2.
5
Ibid.
6
Ibid.
7
Robert B. Gibson, Meinhard Doelle & A. John Sinclair, “Fulfilling the Promise: Basic Components of
Next Generation Environmental Assessment,” Paper Presented at the Journal of Environmental Law and
Practice’s 5th Biennial Conference, “‘Après … le Déluge’: Future Directions of Environmental Law and
Policy in Canada,” University of Calgary Faculty of Law, Calgary, Alberta, June 5-7, 2015.
8
Mark Winfield, “A New Era of Environmental Governance in Canada: Better Decisions Regarding
Infrastructure and Resource Development Projects” (May 2016), Metcalf Foundation Green Prosperity
Papers, online: <http://www.metcalf.com>. The concepts of sustainability and EA are closely related, both
chronologically and conceptually. Moreover, as Winfield explains, there is a sense shared among many that
sustainability and EA are concepts that have promised much while delivering little. Our aim in this paper is
to bring these concepts together in a novel way that is capable of fulfilling their shared promise.
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The Canadian EA regime is broken, a regrettable fact recognized by the federal
government’s comprehensive review of the federal EA regime announced in 2016.9 At a
time when the Canadian economy is both increasingly sluggish and unsustainable, we
have an obligation – and perhaps a once-in-a-generation opportunity – to fundamentally
reform EA to enable it to finally live up to its promise of promoting sound and
sustainability-based decisions. This task is even more pressing in light of the global
commitment under the Paris Climate Change Agreement to rapidly transition to
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions neutrality.10 The implications of this agreement for
Canada are profound: not only must we determine how to radically reduce our economywide GHG emissions, but we must also determine how to adapt to and take advantage of
the economic challenges and opportunities that will arise in association with this global
transition.
Among the many priorities of meaningful EA reform – moving beyond project-level
assessments, focusing on net positive contributions to sustainability, avoiding costly
trade-offs among interdependent economic, ecological, and social objectives – we focus
on the overarching need for polyjural collaboration and polycentric consensus-based
decision-making. In our view, any serious effort to move from project-level EAs focused
exclusively on adverse biophysical impacts towards fully integrated strategic and regional
assessments (SEA and REA) and, ultimately, sustainability-based assessments (SA),
requires a polyjural and polycentric SA regime capable of facilitating collaborative
experimentation among multiple jurisdictional actors, including the federal government,
provinces, territories, municipalities, Indigenous peoples, NGOs, academia, project
proponents and industry groups, and the Canadian public.
Our paper unfolds as follows. Part II describes the federal government’s role in EA. We
argue that federal jurisdiction to conduct comprehensive EAs must be examined at three
key stages: (1) in deciding whether to conduct an assessment; (2) in deciding the scope of
an assessment; and (3) in post-EA decision-making processes. Examining EA at these
three stages reveals a significant gap between the perceived and real constitutional
constraints on the federal government’s ability to base its EA processes and postassessment decision-making on the principle of sustainability. The federal government’s
jurisdiction to make decisions based on the integration of social, economic, and
environmental considerations is far broader than commonly understood.
9

Government of Canada, “Environmental assessment processes: Draft Terms of Reference for Expert
Panel”, online: <https://www.canada.ca/en/services/environment/conservation/assessments/environmentalreviews/share-your-views/eap-draft-terms-reference.html>. See also Chris Tollefson, “Canada’s current
environmental assessment law: a tear-down not a reno”, Policy Options, (13 July 2016), online:
<http://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/july-2016/canadas-current-environmental-assessment-law-a-teardown-not-a-reno/>; see also Jason MacLean, “How to restore trust in Canada’s environmental regulations”,
Toronto Star, (23 June 2016), online: <http://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/july-2016/canadas-currentenvironmental-assessment-law-a-tear-down-not-a-reno/>.
10
Paris Agreement, being an Annex to the Report of the Conference of the Parties on its twenty-first
session, held in parties from 30 November to 13 December 2015 – Addendum Part two: Action taken by the
Conference of the Parties at its twenty-first session, 29 January 2016, Decision 1/CP.21, CP, 21st Sess.,
FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 at 21-36, online: <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/10a01.pdf>.
For an overview of the agreement, see Meinhard Doelle, “The Paris Agreement: Historic Breakthrough or
High Stakes Experiment?” (2016) 6(1-2) Climate Law, forthcoming.
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Part III explores the present and future role of the provinces in EAs over which the
federal government has jurisdiction. It considers three issues: (1) the relevant
constitutional principles and case law where federal and provincial EA jurisdiction
intersect; (2) the recent retreat of the federal government from taking a lead role in
multijurisdictional EAs through a cluster of new initiatives characterized by some EA
scholars as federal “retrenchment”; and (3) potential alternatives to retrenchment that set
the stage for managing polyjural and polycentric SAs capable of delivering efficient,
effective, and socially-licensed policy outcomes.
Part IV argues that the move from EA to SA depends on moving from bi-jural federalprovincial cooperation and so-called “harmonization” to polyjural and polycentric
decision-making, or legal ordering that emerges from formal and informal interactions
and collaborations among multiple levels of government and interested stakeholders. We
proceed by providing two closely related rationales for this conceptual move: (1) a
substantive rationale, and (2) a “realpolitik” rationale grounded in high-profile disputes
over natural resources projects in Canada, including the Federal Court of Appeal’s recent
decision in the Northern Gateway case.11
Part V concludes by setting out a series of possible forms of SA for the purpose of
informing the federal government’s review of its EA regime. In particular, it identifies
and analyzes the competing options for jurisdictional cooperation, collaboration, and
consensus-based assessment processes along with the constitutional and practical policy
implications of each.
II.

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S ROLE
POLITICS

IN

EA: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

AND

The jurisdictional landscape as it applies to EA is complex as the environment touches on
many federal and provincial areas of jurisdiction. An inherent part of this complexity is
the fact that the full implications of proposed activities cannot be properly understood, if
at all, until an assessment is well underway if not completed.12 This complexity is
exacerbated as EA shifts from a process focused on a technical assessment of biophysical
effects to the consideration of a broader range of impacts, benefits, risks, and
uncertainties. The complexity is further amplified as EA moves from a focus on
individual projects to the consideration of broader policies, plans, and programs through
the addition of strategic and regional assessments to the EA toolbox.
In light of these layers of complexity, it is not surprising that federal law-makers and
administrators have been reluctant to apply the federal EA process and to broaden the
scope of federal EA to the full extent of federal jurisdiction. The effect, unfortunately,
has been to seriously hamstring the effectiveness of federal EA as a tool for sound
decision-making. Most relevant to the issue at hand, a limited understanding of the extent
11

Gitxaala Nation v. Canada, 2016 FCA 187 (CanLII).
This creates the potential for different conclusions at the triggering and the decision-making stages of the
EA process about the basis for and scope of federal jurisdiction over the assessed activity.
12
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of federal jurisdiction can eliminate otherwise effective approaches to jurisdictional
harmonization of EA.
A thorough understanding of the full jurisdiction of each level of government to carry out
EA is critical for EA to realize its potential as a tool for good decision-making to
facilitate and accelerate the transition to sustainability, including through jurisdictional
cooperation. As federal EA moves to the consideration of economic, social, and cultural
implications of proposed human activities at project, strategic, and regional levels, the
consideration of the limits of federal jurisdiction must similarly broaden.13
In this Part, we consider the jurisdiction of the federal government over EA in light of the
key elements of next generation EA. The extent and limits of federal jurisdiction in
Canada are critical to an understanding of the jurisdiction of other levels of government,
such as provincial, municipal, and Aboriginal governments. Federal jurisdiction in an
environmental context is considered through the interplay among federal territorial
powers (i.e., powers attaching to federal lands and offshore areas), functional powers, and
conceptual powers.14
From a territorial perspective, it is helpful to think of Canada as made up of two types of
territory, territory in which significant areas jurisdiction have been assigned to the
provinces, and territory where the federal government is assigned comprehensive
jurisdiction. 15 Areas of broad provincial jurisdiction are limited by the territorial
boundaries of each province, and generally do not include federal lands within the
provinces.
Areas of comprehensive federal constitutional jurisdiction include all parts of Canada
beyond the boundaries of the provinces, including the three northern Territories, and
offshore areas beyond the boundaries of the provinces. Federal lands within the territory
of the provinces are also subject to comprehensive federal jurisdiction. For EA, this
means, as a starting point, that there is broad federal power to carry out comprehensive
EAs of activities on federal lands within the provinces, as well as in the three Territories
and offshore.16

13

The need for this transition to the next generation EA is explored elsewhere. For a detailed assessment of
the importance of these transitions for the effectiveness of EA, see Robert B. Gibson, Meinhard Doelle &
A. John Sinclair, “Fulfilling the Promise: Basic Components of Next Generation Environmental
Assessment” (2015) 29 Journal of Environmental Law and Practice 257, which summarizes the working
conclusions of a lengthier monograph posted at <https://uwaterloo.ca/next-generation-environmentalassessment/research-contributions/dissertations-theses-monographs-and-major-reports> [“Next Generation
EA”].
14
These issues are explored in more detail elsewhere. See e.g. Meinhard Doelle & Chris Tollefson,
Environmental Law: Cases and Materials 2nd ed. (Toronto: Thomson/Carswell, 2013). See also Meinhard
Doelle, The Federal Environmental Assessment Process: A Guide and Critique (Markham, Ont.:
LexisNexis Butterworths, 2008), and Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. (Toronto:
Thomson/Carswell, 2007).
15
They can be thought of as provincially- and federally-controlled territory, respectively.
16
The issue is somewhat more complicated as jurisdiction will not only be affected by the location of the
activity, but also by the location of the impacts of the activity.
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Federal functional and conceptual powers are equally critical to understanding the extent
and limits of federal constitutional jurisdiction to carry out EAs of activities in the
remaining territory of Canada, i.e. within the boundaries of Canada’s provinces not on
federal land. In these areas, provinces have broad jurisdiction to carry out EAs, but the
federal level of government still has considerable jurisdiction, which, in many instances,
will lead to broad jurisdiction to carry out EAs.
Functional powers, which refer to subject matters that could be affected by activities
proposed in the context of EA, establish federal jurisdiction over specific subject matters.
Some are focused on specific biophysical issues, such as “Navigation and Shipping” and
“Sea Coasts and Inland Fisheries.”17 Others provide a basis for consideration of a broader
range of issues, such as jurisdiction over Aboriginal communities and interprovincial
transportation.18
Conceptual powers, which can be thought of as tools for the exercise of federal power,
add to the issues that may warrant a federal assessment of proposed activities. They
include powers over federal spending, taxation, trade and commerce, federal works and
undertakings, works declared to be for the advantage of multiple provinces, interprovincial and international aspects of activities, and the residual power over peace,
order, and good government (POGG). The criminal law power is also considered a
conceptual power, as it can be utilized to address societal challenges in a range of subject
areas, including environmental protection.
The extent of federal jurisdiction to carry out an EA, the appropriate scope of an
assessment, and the jurisdiction to make decisions about proposed activities have been
the subject of much discussion among academics and policy-makers. Given the generally
very cautious approach by federal law-makers and administrators, litigation on federal
jurisdiction over EA has been relatively rare. There are, however, two Supreme Court of
Canada cases that considered federal jurisdiction over EA. They involved disputes over
the Oldman River Dam and the Red Chris Mine, respectively.19 These two Supreme
Court of Canada decisions are considered next.
In its 1992 landmark case brought by the Friends of the Oldman River, the Supreme
Court of Canada considered, for the first time, the extent of federal jurisdiction over EA.
It did so in the context of the application of Environmental Assessment and Review
Process (EARP) Guidelines Order to the Oldman River Dam project. One of the key
issues in the case was whether the federal government had jurisdiction to carry out an
environmental assessment of the project before deciding whether and under what
conditions to issue federal fisheries and navigation licenses to permit the project to
proceed.

17

Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3 (U.K.), ss. 91(10) and 91(12) [“Constitution Act, 1867”].
Ibid, s. 91(2) “The Regulation of Trade and Commerce,” and s. 91(24) “Indians, and Lands required for
Indians.”
19
Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada (Minister of Transport), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 3 [“Oldman”],
and MiningWatch Canada v. Canada (Fisheries and Oceans), [2010] 1 S.C.R. 6 [“Red Chris”].
18
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The Supreme Court in Oldman recognizes that there are three key decision points in an
EA from a constitutional perspective: (1) the decision whether to require a federal EA;
(2) the decision about the scope of the federal EA; and (3) federal project decisions after
the completion of the EA. Oldman offers considerable clarity on the first two, but leaves
some uncertainty about the third.
With respect to the ability to require a federal EA, the Supreme Court of Canada clarifies
that federal jurisdiction to carry out the EA can either be in the form of jurisdiction over
the activity itself, or over a potential impact of the project. The court uses an
interprovincial railway project as an example of the former, and a project with potential
impacts on fisheries and navigation as examples of the latter. In case of the railway
project, the federal jurisdiction arises from the federal jurisdiction over the project under
section 91(10) of the Constitution Act, 1867. In this case, it does not matter what the
impact of the project might be. In case of the impact on fisheries and navigation, it does
not matter what the project is, what matters is that it has the potential to affect fisheries or
navigation.
With respect to the scope of a federal assessment, the Supreme Court clarifies that if there
is jurisdiction to carry out an assessment, the assessment can be comprehensive, and can,
at least in cases such as railway projects where the jurisdiction is over the project, include
impacts, benefits, risks, and uncertainties that otherwise fall within the jurisdiction of the
provinces. The case has created some ambiguity about whether the scope of an
assessment is more limited where the federal jurisdiction is based on specific impacts
rather than jurisdiction over the activity itself.20
It is clear that the project decision has to be separated from the decision to carry out an
EA in the first place because the decision to carry out an EA has to be made in the face of
uncertainty and information gaps (that are to be filled through the EA), whereas the
project decision is made after at the conclusion of the information gathering and
assessment process. Jurisdictional issues relating to the post-assessment project decision
are not fully resolved in Oldman. In particular, if there is jurisdiction to make a project
decision, Oldman does not decide whether a federal decision-maker can consider all
impacts, benefits, risks, and uncertainties in deciding whether and under what conditions
to allow the activity to proceed, or whether there are constitutional limits on what can be
considered. Views on the interpretation of the Oldman decision in this regard differ.21
Twenty years after the Oldman decision, the Supreme Court of Canada had the
opportunity to again consider the extent of federal jurisdiction over EA, this time in the
context of the application of the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (1992) to the
proposed Red Chris mine project. The case centered on the question of the scope of the
project to be assessed and related process decisions, but the court also considered
20

See Doelle, The Federal Environmental Assessment Process, supra note 14. See also Quebec (Attorney
General) v. Moses, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 557 at paras. 36-40; Marie-Ann Bowden & Martin Olszynski, “Old
Puzzle, New Pieces: Red Chris and Vanadium and the Future of Federal Environmental Assessment”
(2011) 89 Can. Bar. Rev. 445 at 479.
21
See the analysis of Kennett & Doelle in ibid.
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jurisdictional issues and related questions about multijurisdictional cooperation. The
court rejected narrow scoping as an efficient approach to inter-jurisdictional cooperation.
Instead, it re-enforced the Oldman principle that if there is federal jurisdiction to assess a
proposed activity, there is jurisdiction to do a comprehensive assessment of impacts,
benefits, risks, and uncertainties. The Red Chris decision does not, however, explicitly
address the key area of uncertainty left in Oldman, whether there are limits at the
decision-making stage of the process, and if so, what those limits are.
Other cases, while not directly dealing with EA, have continued to shape our
understanding of federal jurisdiction over the broad range of issues that are relevant in a
modern EA process. Cases such as Zellerbach,22 Hydro Québec,23 and the recent Federal
Court of Appeal ruling in Syncrude24 have demonstrated consistently that the federal
government is to be given considerable latitude in its efforts to deal with the many
serious environmental challenges we face.
Syncrude in particular, while dealing with regulatory powers under the Canadian
Environmental Protection Act 25 rather than EA, confirms the important role of the
criminal law power for federal jurisdiction over environmental protection, and notably
concludes that federal efforts to protect the environment can be integrated with economic
and other factors without overstepping the limits of federal jurisdiction over
environmental protection under the criminal law power. This would suggest much
broader powers to make decisions and impose conditions to implement the results of a
comprehensive, sustainability-based assessment (SA) than assumed in the design and
implementation of the current federal EA regime. The court makes the point that
integrated solutions are not colourable attempts to invade provincial jurisdiction, but are
essential elements of effective environmental governance.26
Similarly, a long list of cases has helped to clarify the federal government’s role with
respect to Aboriginal rights and title.27 Added to this are recent developments, such as
Canada’s endorsement of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples (UNDRIP), the federal government’s commitment to a Nation-to-Nation
relationship with Aboriginal peoples, and the federal government’s endorsement of the
recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.28 While much remains to

22

R. v. Crown Zellerbach Canada Ltd., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 401 [“Zellerbach”].
R. v. Hydro-Québec, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 213 [“Hydro Québec”].
24
Syncrude Canada Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2016 FCA 160 [“Syncrude”].
25
Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, S.C. 1999, c. 33.
26
Syncrude, supra note 24 at paras. 91-93.
27
See e.g. Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 73, [“Haida”]; Taku
River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 550 [“Taku
River”]; Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005] 3 S.C.R. 388,
[“Mikisew”]; Ka'A'Gee Tu First Nation v. Canada (Attorney General), 2012 FC 297, [“KTFN”]; and
Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 257 [“Tsilhqot’in”].
28
While the current federal government recently embraced UNDRIP, it subsequently stated that it will not
adopt UNDRIP directly into Canadian law. See James Munson, “Ottawa won’t adopt UNDRIP directly into
Canadian law: Wilson-Raybould”, iPolitics, (12 July 2016), online: <https://ipolitics.ca/2016/07/12/ottawawont-adopt-undrip-directly-into-canadian-law-wilson-raybould/>. Details regarding the Truth and
23
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be worked out, it is clear that the federal government’s responsibility with respect to
Aboriginal peoples provides it with considerable powers to carry out comprehensive
assessments of proposed activities to ensure that the government respects Aboriginal
rights and title, the duty to consult and accommodate, and the opportunity to work
cooperatively with Aboriginal governments on the assessment of proposed activities.
So where does this leave us with respect to federal jurisdiction to carry out EA? It
suggests that we need to consider federal jurisdiction at three key stages: (1) in deciding
whether to do an assessment; (2) in deciding the scope of an assessment, and (3) in the
post-assessment decision-making processes. With respect to the decision to carry out a
federal assessment, the process would need a trigger that gives careful consideration to
the potential of a proposed activity to affect an area of federal jurisdiction. It seems clear
that in principle, the federal government has the constitutional authority to carry out an
assessment where a proposed activity has a realistic potential to affect an area of federal
jurisdiction. With respect to the scope of the assessment, it seems unlikely in light of
cases such as Oldman, Red Chris, and Syncrude that once a federal EA is triggered,
courts would impose limits on its scope. And with respect to post-assessment decisionmaking, there is some uncertainty about the precise limits of federal jurisdiction, but it is
clear that the results of the assessment need to lay a proper foundation for federal
decision-making. If the assessment identifies clear impacts on areas of federal
jurisdiction, there would be a solid basis for federal jurisdiction that implements an
integrated approach to addressing the impacts identified. However, where an assessment
discloses no impacts triggering federal jurisdiction, the federal government’s jurisdiction
may be more circumscribed (e.g., limited to information gathering but not extending to
past-assessment decision-making). In short, the results of the assessment will necessarily
help determine the decision-making authority of the federal government.
It is clear from the above analysis that there is a significant gap between the perceived
and real constitutional constraints on the federal government’s ability to base its project,
strategic, and regional assessment processes and post-assessment decision-making on the
principle of sustainability. The gap between perceived and actual constitutional powers is
particularly wide with respect to the scope of assessments, and with post-assessment
decision-making. The pre-2012 Canadian Environmental Assessment Act offered a solid
(but cautious) approach to federal-provincial harmonization that was comfortably within
federal jurisdiction at the project level with a focus on biophysical effects. It could have
been more comprehensive in the information-gathering phase, and could have considered
a broader range of issues in its post-assessment decision-making.
For REA and SEA, there seems to be an underlying assumption that beyond the
assessment of federal policies, plans, and programs, regional and strategic assessments
can only be carried out with the cooperation of provinces. What has been missing from
the discussion, however, is a clear separation of the information gathering and assessment
process from the decision-making process. Assuming that REAs and SEAs are primarily
intended to offer appropriate background and contextual information for valid federal
Reconciliation Commission of Canada’s Final Report and 94 “calls to action” are available on the
Commission’s website, online: <http://www.trc.ca/websites/trcinstitution/index.php?p=3>.
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policy-making and for project assessments and project decision-making, there is no
reason to conclude that even a “federal only” REA or SEA would be challenged
successfully on constitutional grounds, as long as the REA or SEA includes issues within
federal jurisdiction. At the project decision-making stage following a project assessment
that considered the results of an REA or SEA, on the other hand, the critical question will
be whether the issues raised in Oldman and Syncrude lead to a conclusion that the project
decision is also a valid exercise of federal jurisdiction. Clearly, these two cases suggest
that federal government has considerable latitude here, but there will be limits that have
yet to be clearly established by the courts.
III.

THE PROVINCIAL
OPPORTUNITIES

ROLE

IN

BI-JURAL

EAS:

OPTIONS

AND

In Part II above, we explored the jurisdictional scope and limits of the federal
government’s constitutional authority over EA. In Part III, we now consider the current
and potential future role of the provinces in EAs over which the federal government has
jurisdiction.
In a federal state, it is virtually inevitable that there will be projects that are subject to
dual jurisdiction, in addition to those that fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of either
the national or, alternatively, a sub-national level of government. In this paper, we are
primarily interested in the challenges associated with EAs for projects that fall under dual
jurisdiction.
The discussion in Part III is in two sections. First, we consider the relevant constitutional
principles and case law that govern instances where federal and provincial EA
jurisdiction intersects. This discussion includes a consideration of two recent court
decisions that are helpful in understanding the judicial attitude to EA and
interjurisdictional conflict.
We then offer an overview of the recent history of governmental efforts to grapple with
the practical and political challenges associated with managing EAs for projects that are
under dual federal-provincial jurisdiction. In the early days of federal EA, this challenge
was largely addressed in an ad hoc fashion, through bilateral federal-provincial
agreements entered into under the auspices of “harmonization.” During the Harper years,
however, a new approach took hold which, among other things, saw the federal
government retreat from taking a lead role in many multijurisdictional EAs through a
cluster of new initiatives that Fitzpatrick and Sinclair call “retrenchment.”29 We consider
and critique the philosophy and recent experience under “retrenchment” with a view to
setting the stage for exploring alternative approaches to managing multijurisdictional EAs
capable of delivering more effective, efficient, and socially licensed policy outcomes.

29

See P.J. Fitzpatrick & A. John Sinclair, “Multi-jurisdictional environmental assessment” in K.S. Hanna,
ed, Environmental Impact Assessment: Practice and Participation, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Oxford University
Press, 2016) at 354-372.
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(a)

Multijurisdictional EAs: Constitutional and practical realities

In Part II above, we argued that the constitutional authority of the federal government to
engage in EAs pertaining to issues or subject matter in which it has an interest is quite
broad and robust; and certainly more broad and robust than it is commonly credited with.
The parameters of this constitutional jurisdiction are defined by the courts, which have,
for the most part, employed a liberal approach.30
At the same time, it would be fair to say that Canadian provinces also enjoy broad and
robust constitutional authority over EA. This jurisdiction is largely a reflection of the fact
that our constitutional regime endows the provincial Crown with ownership of most
public lands and resources. With this endowment comes legislative authority to regulate,
among other things, in relation to “property and civil rights,” “matters of a merely local
or private nature,” “mines and minerals,” “non-renewable natural resources, forestry and
electrical energy,” “municipal institutions,” and “local works and undertakings.”31
There are some important constraints on the ability to legislate, and hence the ability to
conduct EAs, in relation to matters falling within these various heads of power. For one
thing, a province’s ability to regulate under an EA regime is limited territorially to
projects or activities that physically take place within the province. This has implications
in terms of interprovincial projects, as well as those that are proposed to take place in
certain federal or international coastal waters.
Other limitations arise where the provincial jurisdiction over a project or activity
intersects with a competing federal jurisdictional authority such as “fish and fish habitat,”
“navigation and shipping,” or “interprovincial undertakings.” In EAs that involve
intersecting federal and provincial authorities, the courts are sometimes enlisted to
adjudicate the conflict. Depending on the situation, such conflicts may be resolved by
allowing for both levels of government concurrently to regulate or, alternatively, to give
exclusive jurisdiction over the matter to a single government.
Recent controversies over interprovincial pipelines have served to generate some useful
precedents that illuminate the applicable principles where EA jurisdiction overlaps.
The first of these cases arose out of efforts by the City of Burnaby to enforce its bylaws
against Kinder Morgan, the proponent of a pipeline proposed to traverse the municipality.
Burnaby claimed that engineering work being done by the proponent to determine the
viability of pipeline routing violated City bylaws. The B.C. Supreme Court held the key
authority at stake here was the federal power over interprovincial work, including
pipelines.32 In this situation, a provincial law (including a municipal bylaw) that conflicts
with federal law governing the undertaking to the extent that the undertaking might be
frustrated, is inoperative to the extent of the inconsistency by virtue of the doctrine of
30

Refer back to the discussion in Part II above.
Constitution Act, 1867; ss. 92(10), (13), and 16, 92A, and 109; see also Doelle & Tollefson,
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Burnaby (City) v. Trans Mountain Pipeline ULC, 2015 BCSC 2140 at paras. 65, 75 [“Burnaby”].
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federal paramountcy. Likewise, the court held that the Burnaby bylaws were also
inoperative by virtue of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity, due to extent to
which they impaired the core of a federal undertaking.33
Even more directly relevant to a consideration of intersecting federal and provincial
jurisdiction over EA is a challenge brought by the Coastal First Nations (CFN) to an
agreement entered into by the province of British Columbia with the National Energy
Board. 34 This so-called “equivalency agreement” purported to fully delegate to the
federal regulator all provincial authority to conduct an EA and render an EA “decision”
on a broad range of energy projects – including both the Northern Gateway and Kinder
Morgan pipeline projects – that were subject to federal and provincial assessments. CFN
argued that the province did not have statutory authority to abdicate its authority to make
an EA decision on the Northern Gateway project, and that the agreement should be
declared invalid to the extent that it purported to delegate this authority to the National
Energy Board.
Northern Gateway argued that due to its interprovincial character the pipeline was within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government, and accordingly that there was no
provincial power to make an EA decision that imposed conditions or requirements on the
project. In the alternative, Northern Gateway relied on Burnaby to contend that the
province’s statutory authority to conduct a provincial assessment and make a provincial
decision on the project should be read as inoperative on the basis of federal paramountcy
and interjurisdictional immunity.
The B.C. Supreme Court rejected all of Northern Gateway’s submissions. In its view,
unlike in Burnaby, the province’s EA law did not trench on or impair the core of the
federal undertaking. Moreover, the court distinguished the cases where federal
jurisdiction over a project has been held to be exclusive on the basis that proposed
pipeline and terminal “extends more than 600 kilometres across the Province on
predominantly [provincial] Crown land…[and] will have substantial impact on British
Columbia’s coastal lands and water.”35 In the words of the court:
This project…while interprovincial, is not national and it
disproportionately impacts the interests of British Columbians.
To disallow provincial environmental regulation over the Project
because it engages a federal undertaking would significantly limit
the Province’s ability to protect social, cultural and economic
interests in its lands and waters. It would also go against the
current trend in the jurisprudence favouring, where possible, cooperative federalism…36
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Ibid at paras. 78-81.
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Ibid at para. 52.
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Ibid at para. 53.
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For federal EA law reform, the take-away lessons from Burnaby and CFN are that courts
will tend to uphold provincial EA laws even where they trench on federal jurisdiction if
they are enacted in a bona fide manner to identify and protect provincial interests. Only
where the challenged law or measure substantially impairs a core feature or function of a
federal law will the courts intervene. Among other things, this non-interventionist posture
is founded on an emerging judicial appreciation of the value of co-operative federalism,
particularly in the orchestration of public policy in a realm as polyjural and polycentric as
environmental assessment.
(b)

From harmonization to retrenchment: Evolving federal policy
governing the provincial role in ‘federal’ EAs

During the first decade-and-a-half after the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act was
enacted, considerable political energy and attention was focused on addressing the dual
or multijurisdictional EA overlap through EA harmonization. The goal of harmonization
is to rationalize EA processes with a view to reducing duplication, easing the burden on
project proponents, and marshaling resources in a more effective and efficient manner.37
Rhetorically, the ideal of harmonization is a model in which proponents can satisfy all
their EA duties by liaising through “one window” with all necessary governmental
entities.38
These harmonization efforts have been guided and inspired by a national accord on
environmental harmonization, signed by Canadian Council of Ministers of Environment
(CCME) in 1998.39 This accord has led to bilateral harmonization agreements between
Canada and seven provinces and one territory.40 Leading EA scholars offer an ambivalent
judgment on the efficacy of these agreements. While, over time, these agreements have
lent some new administrative consistency to EA processes,41 in some key areas – most
notably, public participation – significant interjurisdictional differences remain.42 More
importantly, progress towards harmonizing the legal architecture and requirements of
Canadian EA regimes has been at best modest.43
One province that has grown particularly impatient with these harmonization efforts is
British Columbia. According to data gathered by the B.C. government, under the former
Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, EA projects in British Columbia were subject
to comprehensive federal EA studies at nearly twice the rate of any other province.
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Ibid at186.
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Ibid.
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Moreover, of the projects that are subject to an EA under B.C. provincial law, about 60%
(or 42 out of 71) are also subject to federal EA requirements.44
When the former Canadian Environmental Assessment Act came up for parliamentary
review in 2011, the B.C. government argued forcefully that economic development in the
province was being severely hampered by these overlapping requirements.45 In its view, a
new approach to managing overlap was needed. Instead of harmonization, British
Columbia argued that the federal government should exempt most projects from federal
EA requirements if the project was also subject to a B.C.-led EA. Under this approach,
proponents would only be required to undergo “a single (provincial) assessment.”46
As a quid pro quo, British Columbia would agree not to conduct its own provincial
assessment in “certain circumstances” where the federal government was “best suited to
conduct the assessment.” Such circumstances would include projects involving “matters
of national significance (e.g., interjurisdictional projects).47 In such cases, the role of the
province would be limited to “providing technical input, and administering subsequent
provincial permits.”48
In support of its argument that the federal government should stand aside and allow
British Columbia to lead a single EA under provincial law for most projects falling under
dual jurisdiction, the B.C. government claimed that the EA process in British Columbia
“meets or exceeds the rigor of the federal environmental assessment process.”49 To
bolster this claim, it submitted a tabular comparison of B.C. and federal EA processes
that purported to show that both processes had analogous elements and requirements.50
The B.C. government’s submissions on EA reform in 2011 proved highly influential. The
following year, when the Harper government unveiled the Canadian Environmental
Assessment Act, 2012,51 British Columbia’s proposed changes were embodied, largely
intact, in the new law.
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Fitzpatrick and Sinclair describe the CEAA, 2012 reform package as federal EA
“retrenchment,” a term they employ to characterize a deliberate strategy of “limiting the
application of federal EA.”52 In the realm of multijurisdictional EAs, the package created
three new avenues through which the federal government could hand off its EA duties:
(1) delegation;53 (2) substitution;54 and (3) exemption.55
Under both the delegation and substitution powers, the federal government is now
empowered to hand off its EA duties to a province or territory in relation to particular
projects that would otherwise require a federal EA. In these two situations, the federal
government retains the right to make an ultimate decision based on the delegated or
substituted EA. The exemption power goes even further. Where this power is exercised,
the federal government forfeits its right to make a final EA decision.
Not surprisingly, the province of British Columbia has been quick to take advantage of
these new provisions. Since 2012, the province has persuaded the federal government to
exercise its new delegation and substitution powers repeatedly. British Columbia has
been particularly successful in securing federal agreement to EA substitutions, which
now total fourteen and are primarily used in respect of mining and LNG-related
projects.56
British Columbia has also followed through on its commitment to stand aside and let the
federal government go it alone on certain projects of national significance.57 The B.C.
government has entered into two agreements that fall into this category.58 By far the most
controversial of these, of course, is the equivalency agreement concluded in 2010 with
the National Energy Board. By virtue of this agreement, as discussed above, the B.C.
government purported to give up both its right to conduct an EA of current and future
energy projects falling under the jurisdiction of the National Energy Board, but also its
authority to make a final EA decision on such projects, including the power to impose
conditions on project approval.
Throughout the Northern Gateway hearings, there were loud and persistent calls for the
province to repudiate this agreement, and undertake its own made-in-British-Columbia
EA. Ultimately, some six years after signing on to this agreement, due to the CFN’s
successful legal challenge, the B.C. Environmental Assessment Office is now being
required to conduct its own ex post facto EAs of both the Northern Gateway and Kinder
Morgan projects.
52
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Given the reciprocal economic development-related benefits that both the Harper
government and the B.C. government secured through CEAA, 2012, not only does this
package reflect federal EA retrenchment, it also reflects a strong element of
“rapprochement” between Ottawa and Victoria. Among other things, this is a clear
illustration of why so-called cooperative federalism and harmonization do not necessarily
result in improved environmental governance.59 A new approach is needed, one that
moves from uncoordinated and often contentious EAs to an integrated and consensusbased sustainability assessment (SA) regime. In Part IV below, we provide two rationales
for this transition; Part V then concludes with a discussion of the possible forms SA
might take.
IV.

BEYOND B-JURAL FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL EA TO POLYJURAL AND
POLYCENTRIC SUSTAINABILITY ASSESSMENT (SA): INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES, MUNICIPALITIES, AND CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION

In order to move from EA to SA,60 we must also move beyond the unfulfilled promise of
bijural federal-provincial cooperation to the potential of polyjural and polycentric
decision-making. By polyjural, we mean legal ordering that emerges, not only out of
explicit federal and provincial government initiatives, but also from a broad array of other
actors – local communities and municipalities, Indigenous Nations and communities,
environmental nongovernmental organizations (ENGOs), various industry participants,
consultants, and lobbyists, academic commentators, and other members of the public –
and an equally broad array of interactions, formal and informal in nature. 61 By
polycentric, we mean decision-making that facilitates responsibility, trust, and
experimentation with potential solutions among multiple actors at multiple levels of
social and political organization. 62 Below we offer two interrelated rationales for
59
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adopting a polyjural and polycentric approach to SA: (1) a substantive rationale, and (2) a
“realpolitik” rationale.
(a) The substantive rationale for polyjural and polycentric SA
The substantive rationale for moving beyond bijural federal-provincial EA harmonization
to a polyjural and polycentric SA model stems from the core elements of sustainability
itself. Although a contested concept, the core elements of sustainability have been well
established by decades of deliberation, experimentation, and social learning.63 Current
conditions and prevailing trends in the biophysical and socioeconomic dimensions of
human wellbeing are not sustainable.64 Moreover, the biophysical and socioeconomic
dimensions of our wellbeing are inextricably interlinked.65
Driving unsustainability are three contributing factors: (1) excessive demands on our
planetary boundaries, including unprecedented and still rising atmospheric greenhouse
gas emissions, biodiversity loss, groundwater and soil depletion, ocean acidification, and
the depletion of fish stocks; (2) insufficient nutrition, clean water, sanitation, and access
to health care for much of the world’s population; and (3) the reproduction of manifestly
unjust political and legal structures that perpetuate and deepen the first two drivers of
unsustainability. These factors are simultaneously cultural, economic, political, legal, and
biophysical.66
Sustainability is thus at once an analytic and a normative concept.67 Analytically, the
concept of sustainability encompasses the complex interactions among and effects of
economic activity, cultural, political, and legal arrangements, and the Earth’s biophysical
environment, including the planetary boundaries we are currently exceeding. 68
Normatively, sustainability expresses an aspirational view of the future characterized by
social inclusivity and equality coupled with respect for and maintenance of our planet’s
biophysical boundaries.69
<http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/abs/10.1596/1813-9450-5095>; see also Elinor Ostrom, “Beyond
Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems” (2010) 100 American
Economic Review 1. Insofar as polycentrism also emphasizes the importance of making decisions as close
to the scene of events and responsible actors as possible, polycentrism complements the principle of
subsidiarity. See e.g. the Supreme Court of Canada’s discussion of this principle in 114957 Canada Ltée
(Spraytech, Société d’arrosage) v. Hudson (Town), [2001] 2 S.C.R. 241 at para. 3. Once again, Gibson,
Doelle & Sinclair anticipate the need for polycentric assessment in their call for “expanding understanding,
engagement and collaborative ability, in part by combining decision making with mutual learning,
consensus building, and fostering the skills needed in democratic deliberation and decision making.”
Gibson, Doelle & Sinclair, “Next Generation EA”, supra note 13.
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Sachs, The Age of Sustainable Development, supra note 67 at 3. Sachs’ conception is slightly different,
calling for “socially inclusive and environmentally sustainable economic growth.” We are not so sure,
however, that perpetual economic growth can be reconciled with the other core elements of sustainability.
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To effectively integrate the social, economic, and environmental elements of
sustainability and realize its aspirations, we must add a fourth element: good
governance. 70 Sachs notes – rightly – that good governance cannot refer only to
governments;71 it must also include corporate actors, who often exert an outsize influence
on the political process.72 Sachs’ point is correct, but incomplete. In order to achieve the
aspirational goals of sustainability – including social inclusivity and equality – the
analytic governance model of sustainability must also be socially inclusive and equal –
i.e., polyjural and polycentric. 73 As Gibson, Doelle, and Sinclair observe, “current
governance resources and approaches are insufficient, and […] authoritarian alternatives
lack the potential for complex understanding and lasting credibility required for the
job.”74 Polyjural and polycentric governance, by contrast, not only reflects the analytic
and normative nature of sustainability, but it also produces better substantive decisions.
It is well established, for example, that enhanced opportunities for public participation
have improved the quality of environmental decision-making.75 Structures for public
participation were originally significant features of EA.76 These structures have typically
included public notices and invitations to comment on proposed projects, opportunities to
make depositions and, in some cases, more formal presentations of evidence before EA
panels and hearings.77 Significant as these opportunities have proven in some instances,
“their ability to alter the trajectory of economic activities in the direction of sustainability
has never been fully realized.”78
The unrealized potential of public participation in EA can be traced to the predominantly
“bipartite bargaining” nature of environmental decision-making in Canada, whereby
decisions are influenced primarily by the relevant government agencies and the privatesector actors involved (or, in some cases, between the different levels of government
70

Ibid at 3-4.
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involved).79 Bipartite bargaining has increasingly been perceived by the public – not
unjustly – as deficient due to its tendency to exclude local knowledge and the interests of
affected communities.80
Hence the need for polyjural and polycentric SA. Public participation in sustainabilitybased decision-making has the potential to facilitate the meaningful inclusion of diverse
perspectives, which are in turn capable – arguably most capable – of thoroughly and
reliably reviewing project proposals. 81 According to a recent analysis of eight case
studies of EAs involving Indigenous groups, for instance, greater Indigenous
participation resulted in improved project design, the integration of new knowledge about
potential impacts, discovery of new ways to mitigate environmental damage and
community impacts, and the opportunity for greater collaboration. 82 Greater
collaboration, however, will only be achieved by encouraging and enabling the equal and
ongoing participation of a plurality of voices. While the traditional “notice and comment”
approach is capable of furnishing decision-makers with more information, a better
understanding of the competing interests at stake, and the likely consequences of
different courses of action, this approach neither accounts for nor alters the inequality of
resources, power, and influence among different social and political groups. Indeed,
reliance on notice-and-comment-style public participation may actually further entrench
this inequality. Decision-makers are rarely if ever legally obligated to respond to issues
raised in public comments, and in practice, the most influential comments tend to be
those that provide decision-makers with the kinds of data and sophisticated analyses that
may be used to justify decisions.83 Representative government “has given way to a world
in which the prime minister’s courtiers talk to a handful of senior Cabinet ministers, a
few carefully selected deputy ministers, lobbyists, former public servants turned
consultants, heads of friendly associations, and some CEOs of larger private firms. This
permeates all aspects of government – even regulation.”84
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A polyjural and polycentric approach to SA calls for more balanced inclusion,
involvement, and influence of affected interests and stakeholders.85 SA decision-making
must move beyond the passive interest group pluralism of the notice-and-comment model
by institutionalizing the ongoing involvement of underrepresented interests throughout
the SA process. This inclusion and the resulting balance of competing interests will allow
SA decision-makers to open up the SA process to multiple forms of data and experiment
with a variety of potential solutions. While this proposal may appear to run counter to
prevailing norms of centralized coordination, administrative efficiency, and market
certainty, increased interaction and experimentation among multiple actors at multiple
levels of social organization has the potential to facilitate the emergence of common
standards, practices, and commitments over time.86 This, of course, is not an entirely new
idea. The federal government, for instance, once relied on multi-stakeholder regulatory
advisory committees – such as the National Roundtable on the Environment and
Economy – that were often able to achieve a remarkable level of consensus on complex
issues.87 In fact, the advice received and the credibility gained by the involvement of
independent voices have stood up well over time.88
(b) The realpolitik rationale for polyjural and polycentric SA
The substantive benefits (i.e., better decisions) of polyjural and polycentric SA aside,
there is also a compelling “realpolitik” rationale for this more expansive approach to
facilitating and accelerating sustainability. As discussed above, decisions that ignore local
knowledge and the perspectives of affected stakeholders are increasingly viewed – again,
not unjustly – as democratically unaccountable and politically illegitimate. In the
parlance of our times, such decisions lack “social license.” 89 To cite a recent and
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This involvement ought to be enshrined in legislation and upheld by robust judicial review. As Olszynski
argues, “the polycentric nature of the exercise [of EA] underscores the important role of both the Act
[CEAA, 2012] and the courts in ensuring that environmental concerns are not ignored or marginalized in the
face of traditionally predominant considerations (e.g. economic ones).” Martin Olszynski, “Northern
Gateway: Federal Court of Appeal Applies Wrong CEAA Provisions and Unwittingly Affirms
Regressiveness
of
2012
Budget
Bills”,
Ablawg.ca,
(5
July
2016),
online:
<http://ablawg.ca/2016/07/05/northern-gateway-federal-court-of-appeal-wrong-ceaa-provisions/>.
86
This, generally, is the argument of “democratic experimentalism.” See e.g. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F.
Sabel, “A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism” (1998) 98 Columbia Law Review 267.
87
National Roundtable on the Environment and Economy, “National Roundtable on the Environment and
Economy”,
(22
March
2013),
online:
<http://collectionscanada.gc.ca/webarchives2/20130322140948/http:/nrtee-trnee.ca/>, discussed in Gibson,
Doelle & Sinclair, “Next Generation EA”, supra note 13. Another notable example is the multi-stakeholder
Regulatory Advisory Committee (RAC) established to help guide the Canadian Environmental Assessment
Agency in respect of federal EA. During its operation it was held up as the example of how to engage a full
range of stakeholders in regulatory design and operation. Efforts are currently underway to revive this
committee.
88
Jeffrey Simpson, “Ottawa kills the emissions messenger”, The Globe and Mail, (20 June 2012), online:
<http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/ottawa-kills-the-emissions-messenger/article4350552/>,
discussed in Gibson, Doelle & Sinclair, “Next Generation EA”, supra note 13.
89
Jason Prno & D. Scott Slocombe, “Exploring the origins of ‘social license to operate’ in the mining
sector: Perspectives from governance and sustainability theories” (2012) 37:3 Resource Policy 346; see
also Jason MacLean, “Gateway to Nowhere: Environmental Assessment, the Duty to Consult, and the
Social License to Operate in Gitxaala Nation v. Canada (Northern Gateway)”, Toronto Law Journal, (July
2016),
online:

20
prominent example, the federal Liberal Party’s 2015 election platform repeatedly stated
that oil pipeline projects must obtain “social license,” and that while governments grant
permits, “only communities can grant permission” for projects to proceed.90
Since their inception, EA processes have been viewed as a means of managing the
political risks and resolving the social conflicts around major infrastructure and resource
extraction projects.91 Major project reviews remain at the forefront of social, political,
and legal conflicts in Canada, including conflicts among Indigenous peoples, multiple
levels of government, ENGOs and concerned citizens, and industry interests about not
only how to exploit natural resources, but also about whether to exploit them at all.92 A
polyjural and polycentric approach to SA is ideally suited to resolving such “super
wicked” problems involving “enormous interdependencies, uncertainties, circularities,
and conflicting stakeholders.”93
A case in point is the political and legal struggle over Northern Gateway (discussed
briefly in Part III above), a 1,178 kilometre and $7.9-billion oil pipeline that would carry
approximately 525,000 barrels per day of oil sands crude from Alberta through the Great
Bear Rainforest to the coast of British Columbia for export to Pacific markets. 94
Characterized as a “critical infrastructure project” by Northern Gateway’s president and
supported explicitly and enthusiastically by the former Harper government at the federal
level and tacitly by the Notley government in Alberta, the project would also entail the
construction of tanker and marine terminals in Kitimat, British Columbia to
accommodate some 190-250 tanker calls per year. The estimated operational life of
Northern Gateway, were it ever to be approved, is approximately 50 years.
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In Gitxaala Nation v. Canada, a majority of the Federal Court of Appeal quashed the
Governor-in-Council (Cabinet) Order directing the National Energy Board to issue a
certificate of public convenience and necessity to Northern Gateway on the ground that
the federal government failed to fulfill its constitutional duty to consult affected First
Nations. 95 The majority’s reasoning is a remarkable indictment of the Harper
government’s consultation of First Nations: “we are satisfied that Canada failed” during
the project’s consultation process “to engage, dialogue and grapple with the concerns
expressed to it in good faith by all of the applicant/appellant First Nations. Missing was
any indication of an intention to amend or supplement the conditions imposed by the
Joint Review Panel, to correct any errors or omissions in its Report, or to provide
meaningful feedback in response to the material concerns raised. Missing was a real and
sustained effort to pursue meaningful two-way dialogue.”96
The majority was also critical (if obliquely) of the Joint Review Panel, which was formed
under the former Canadian Environmental Assessment Act and later modified under
CEAA, 2012 and the National Energy Board Act.97 According to the majority, “legitimate
and serious concerns about the effect of the Project upon the interests of the affected First
Nations” remained even after the pipeline proponent’s voluntary undertakings and the
209 conditions imposed on the project. “Some of these were considered by the Joint
Review Panel but many of these were not, given the Joint Review Panel’s terms of
reference.”98
The legal and political saga of Northern Gateway illustrates both the “realpolitik”
rationale of polyjural and polycentric decision-making, as well as its realistic limits. First,
consider the sheer number and diversity of stakeholders involved. First, there is the
proponent, Northern Gateway Pipelines Limited Partnership and Northern Gateway
Pipelines Inc., which are backed by Enbridge Inc. as well as Suncor Energy Inc.,
Cenovus Energy Inc., MEG Energy Corp., Nexen Energy ULC, and Total SA. As noted
above, the project was supported by the former federal government and the current
Alberta provincial government; both the National Energy Board and the Attorney
General of British Columbia intervened in the case before the Federal Court of Appeal,
along with the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers. The project also has 26
Aboriginal equity partners representing almost 60% of the Aboriginal communities along
the pipeline’s right of way, approximately 60% of the area’s First Nations’ population,
and approximately 80% of the area’s combined First Nations and Métis population.99
Opposed to the project are a number of First Nations, including Gitxaala Nation, Haisla
Nation, Gitga’at First Nation, Kitasoo Xai’Xais Band Council, Heiltsuk Tribal Council,
Nadleh Whut’en and Nak’azdli Whut’en, and Haida Nation.100 Also opposed to the
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project are a number of NGOs, including ForestEthics Advocacy Association, Living
Oceans Society, Raincoast Conservation Foundation, B.C. Nature, Amnesty
International, and the labour union Unifor.101 A number of individuals also appeared
before the court on their own behalf. The municipality of Kitimat, meanwhile, previously
held a plebiscite over Northern Gateway and voted against the project by a margin of
58.4% to 41.6%.102
The previous federal government’s authoritarian, top-down approach to Northern
Gateway “fell short of the mark.”103 Given the plurality of stakeholders having a serious
interest in the project and its effects, how could such an approach have turned out
otherwise?
The majority of the Federal Court of Appeal appears to have recognized this
complicating factor in Northern Gateway, explaining that the Governor in Council’s
assessment of the project had to grapple with a broad variety of matters, including
economic, social, cultural, environmental, and political matters, which are “of a
polycentric and diffuse kind.”104 A decision-making process that excludes or effectively
ignores the concerns and perspectives of affected stakeholders runs the very real risk, not
only of being substantively incomplete and wrongheaded, but also democratically
unaccountable and politically illegitimate (as well as legally invalid, under particular
circumstances). Northern Gateway is anything but a special case. Northern Gateway is an
avatar of the “realpolitik” of sustainability assessment in Canada today.
However, an important caveat is in order. Genuine polyjural and polycentric SA must
ask, not only how a proposed project should proceed, but also whether it should proceed
at all. The opening up of sustainability-based decision-making to a broader array of
interests and interactions ought not to be a procedural substitute for substantive
sustainability. While the majority of the court in Northern Gateway appears to understand
the polycentric nature of the project’s assessment and the failure of the government to
engage in meaningful consultation with affected First Nations stakeholders, its
articulation of the constitutional duty to consult falls far short of the principles of
polyjural and polycentric decision-making. According to the majority,
[327] However, the Phase IV consultations did not sufficiently allow for
dialogue, nor did they fill the gaps. In order to comply with the law, Canada’s
officials needed to be empowered to dialogue on all subjects of genuine
interest to affected First Nations, to exchange information freely and candidly,
to provide explanations, and to complete their task to the level of reasonable
fulfilment. Then recommendations, including any new proposed conditions,
needed to be formulated and shared with Northern Gateway for input. And,
finally, these recommendations and any necessary information needed to be
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placed before the Governor in Council for its consideration. In the end, it has
not been demonstrated that any of these steps took place.
[328] In our view, this problem likely would have been solved if the
Governor in Council granted a short extension of time to allow these steps to
be pursued. But in the face of the requests of affected First Nations for more
time, there was silence. As best as we can tell from the record, these requests
were never conveyed to the Governor in Council, let alone considered.
[329] Based on this record, we believe that an extension of time in the
neighbourhood of four months—just a fraction of the time that has passed
since the Project was first proposed—might have sufficed. Consultation to a
level of reasonable fulfilment might have further reduced some of the
detrimental effects of the Project identified by the Joint Review Panel. And it
would have furthered the constitutionally-significant goals the Supreme Court
has identified behind the duty to consult—the honourable treatment of
Canada’s Aboriginal peoples and Canada’s reconciliation with them.105

“It would have taken Canada little time and little organizational effort to engage in
meaningful dialogue on these and other subjects of prime importance to Aboriginal
peoples,” the majority added.
Contrast this reasoning – which curiously conjoins “meaningful dialogue” and “little time
and little organizational effort” – with Gitga’at First Nation elder Art Sterritt’s response
to the court’s judgment. According to Mr. Sterritt, additional consultation will not pave
the way to his nation’s acceptance of the project. “The Gitga’at people are absolutely
against this project. There is really no good that can come of the Northern Gateway
project…. Just one spill from this project basically wipes out our access to our food,
wipes out our economy, wipes out our culture.”106
In a polyjural and polycentric model of SA, “no” must be on the table as a legitimate
outcome from the very outset of any assessment. No amount of process or “best
practices” can substitute for a lack of substantive sustainability as determined through a
genuinely plural and structurally balanced learning and decision-making process.107
While Northern Gateway is now all but off the table, this does little to change the popular
perception that “Canada needs a way to get Albertan oil to new markets, and that the
most efficient and safest way to do that is via pipeline.”108 Following the Federal Court of
Appeal’s decision in Gitxaala Nation, The Globe and Mail’s editorial board declared that
the “best bet now is Kinder Morgan’s Trans Mountain project, which would bring
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Alberta crude to the Port of Vancouver.”109 The trouble with this assessment, however, is
that Vancouver wants nothing to do with the Trans Mountain pipeline, and has
commenced a judicial review of the National Energy Board’s conditional
recommendation of the project.110 The municipality of Burnaby, British Columba also
opposes the project because the pipeline would run through a significant local
conservation area. A number of First Nations (including Tsleil-Waututh, Squamish, and
Musqueam), ENGOs, and a large number of concerned citizens also oppose the
project.111 A number of other major natural resources projects – TransCanada’s Energy
East pipeline, Petronas’ LNG terminal, British Columbia’s Site C hydroelectric dam, any
number of proposed industrial wind turbine projects – raise substantially similar
sustainability concerns and face equally significant opposition. The need for a renewed,
polyjural, and polycentric SA model in Canada, particularly after Canada’s ratification of
the Paris climate change agreement, is urgent.
V.

CONCLUSION: POTENTIAL FORMS
SA

OF

POLYJURAL

AND

POLYCENTRIC

In Part II above, we argued that the federal jurisdiction to conduct comprehensive EAs
integrating social, economic, and environmental considerations is far broader than
commonly understood. In Part III, however, we showed that the federal EA jurisdiction is
also far from all-encompassing, and may be successfully challenged if it limits a
province’s ability to protect its own social and economic interests. As a result of this
inevitable constitutional complexity, many have called for a cooperative federalism and
harmonized EA. But as Part II also illustrates, EA processes carried out under the banner
of cooperation and harmonization have not resulted in sound, sustainable, or socially
licensed EA processes or decisions. Accordingly, in Part IV we proposed a shift from bijural EA to polyjural and polycentric SA embodying collaborative and consensus-based
decision-making.
In order to tie the insights of Parts III-IV together and offer practical law reform
guidance, below we describe five principal options for jurisdictional collaboration and
consensus in conducting project reviews with the aim of facilitating sustainability:
1. Each jurisdiction conducts its own comprehensive SA, including the federal
government and any potentially affected provincial, territorial, municipal, and
Aboriginal governments, and each jurisdiction makes its own project decision
based on its own assessment;
2. A single jurisdiction conducts a comprehensive SA, and all other affected levels
of government use the SA to make their own project decisions;
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3. A single jurisdiction carries out a comprehensive SA, and that jurisdiction alone
makes the project decision;
4. All affected jurisdictions cooperate in carrying out a joint and comprehensive SA,
and each jurisdiction involved makes its own decision; and
5. All affected jurisdictions cooperate in carrying out a joint and comprehensive SA,
and each jurisdiction involved engages in a good faith negotiation aimed at
achieving a consensus decision (failing which the process reverts to option four
above).
Each of the foregoing five options involves different constitutional and practical policy
implications. Option one – call it the multiple silos approach to SA – is plainly
inefficient. If affected jurisdictions respond by focusing on the core and constitutionally
uncontested areas of their jurisdiction, project decisions run the risk of being based on an
incomplete understanding of the project’s public policy implications, Moreover, the
complexity of the multiple silos approach to SA will be confusing, burdensome, and
ultimately inaccessible to Canadians. The multiple silos option may also lead to a lack of
clarity and a legal dispute over who has the jurisdiction to decide what. In other words,
this option suffers from a lack of coordination at not only the assessment stage but also at
the decision and post-decision stages of project reviews.
Option two – call it the follow-the-leader approach to SA – may in certain circumstances
be unconstitutional. In Part II above we canvassed the constitutionality of the delegation
and substitution of EAs between the federal government and provincial governments. For
the most part, courts will uphold provincial EA laws, even if they trench on federal
powers, so long as they are enacted in a bona fide manner to identify and protect
genuinely provincial interests; only where an impugned law substantially impairs a core
function of federal law will the courts intervene. More importantly, the follow-the-leader
approach to SA runs the serious risk of producing poor and socially unlicensed decisions.
As Canada’s largely disappointing EA legacy illustrates, 112 because some decisionmakers will not have been sufficiently engaged in the assessment process to properly
appreciate the subtleties and complexities of the issues at stake. Given this complexity, it
would be a significant challenge for a single jurisdiction to carry out a comprehensive SA
without the full engagement of other affected governments and communities.
Option three – call it the authoritarian approach to SA – may well be problematic from a
constitutional perspective under certain circumstances in addition to leading to unsound
decision-making In Part II above we noted that British Columbia’s equivalency
agreement with the National Energy Board was determined to be unconstitutional in
Coastal First Nations because it violated the B.C. Environmental Assessment Act (as well
as the duty to consult under s. 35 of the constitution); were the statutory language clear
and unequivocal with respect to British Columbia abdicating its responsibility to conduct
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an EA and its power to make a decision on projects otherwise within its jurisdiction,
however, the British Columbia Supreme Court was quite clear that the arrangement
would be constitutional. Accordingly, equivalency agreements of this kind are most
likely not per se unconstitutional. The principal problem with the authoritarian approach,
rather, is that it will produce poor policy results, particularly when viewed through the
polyjural and polycentric lenses of sustainability, which call for a diametrically opposed
approach – plural, not singular and isolationist; collaborative and consensus-based, not
authoritarian and unilateral. Canada’s approach to the Northern Gateway review is an
example par excellance of the authoritarian approach. The disastrous result was neither
effective, nor efficient, nor socially licensed.
Option four, by contrast, is polyjural – if not entirely polycentric – and offers an
enhanced combination of effectiveness, efficiency, and social license. By emphasizing
polyjural collaboration and comprehensiveness at the assessment stage in particular, this
approach is unlikely to produce the kind of controversial and socially unacceptable
decision-making that excludes relevant issues and interests and that has become the norm
of late in Canada. However, not unlike the multiple silos approach of option one, this
form of SA nonetheless runs the risk of leading to a lack of clarity and possibly legal
disputes over which jurisdiction has ultimate project decision-making authority. In a
federal system such as Canada’s, this particular risk can never be eliminated entirely, and
the perfect can be the enemy of the more than good enough. When it comes to the
ambitious agenda of facilitating and accelerating sustainability through SA, option four
may well be more than good enough.
Before concluding, however, a word about the perfect form of SA – SA that is equally
polyjural and polycentric (option 5) – is in order. In a perfectly polyjural and polycentric
SA regime, collaboration and comprehensiveness are married to consensus-based
decision-making and constitutional clarity. While collaboration and comprehensiveness
may appear to run counter to the federal government’s stated preference for efficiency
and the elimination of duplication,113 this approach has the potential to be the most
efficient option of all. While its costs – both in terms of resources and time – are not
negligible, they are largely up-front costs, which are likely to be far lower than the
considerable back-end costs associated with community opposition and court challenges.
The polycentric nature of decision-making aimed at consensus, where successful, is
capable of virtually eliminating such back-end costs owing to a lack of social license.114
In our view, a combination of options five and four is the ideal form for SA to take – call
it perfectly polyjural and polycentric SA (option five) with a safety net (reversion to
option four where consensus cannot be reached).
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***
We are at a crossroads. As we conclude this paper, Canada has ratified the Paris climate
change agreement but has yet to propose – much less enact and implement – a climate
change policy capable of meeting our hugely ambitious commitments under that
agreement. Last year, more than 150 countries – including Canada – adopted the UN’s
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, which includes a set of 17 Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) designed to end poverty, fight inequality and injustice, and
tackle climate change by 2030.115 The federal government insists – repeatedly – that
Canada must get its resources to market in a sustainable manner, but it has yet to explain
what a sustainable manner would be. The 2008 Federal Sustainable Development Act, on
its face a promising piece of legislation intended to facilitate the incorporation of
sustainability considerations into all government decision-making and operations, is set
to expire in 2016 without even remotely approaching the accomplishment of its
objectives. 116 The past ten years are widely regarded as a “lost decade” from the
perspective of advancing sustainability in Canada.117 We may not be able to afford
another. Not unlike the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline Inquiry, which was effectively
Canada’s first EA and which was designed to resolve societal disputes over the
distribution of the benefits, costs, and risks of a major natural resources project,118
polyjural and polycentric SA has the potential not only to resolve intensifying
multijurisdictional disputes over the direction of energy and economic development in
Canada in a manner that is effective, efficient, and socially inclusive, but also to develop
widely-shared commitments about Canada’s future.
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